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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
strued so as to reach an absurd and unenforcible result.40 Therefore it was neces-
sary to assume that the parties intended the contract to be concurrent with the
copyright term.
The dissent argues that the interpretation placed on the contract by the ma-
jority, while unquestionably a more just construction, was construed "so as to make
[it] mean what the courts think [it] should have said in the first place."41 They
preferred to adopt the principle that a person making a poor contract is never-'
theless bound by that contract even though it works an injustice. They felt that
as a practical matter neither party considered at the time of the contract that the
songs would still be popular thirty years later, and therefore neither had worded
the contract to provide for such a situation. But the contract, as it was written by
the parties, provided for royalties on each copy published, and in the absence of
a limiting term must be applied as long as the defendant continues to publish
the music.
Probably the dissent is quite correct in its method of contract interpretation.
The consideration which Shubert offered was the right of original publication,
simultaneous with the presentation of "Maytime," and the copyright was left to
the publisher to be his protection from other publications. The parties intended
the consideration of the defendant to be a royalty of five cents a copy for each
copy, whenever published. But the protection of the public interest against undue
restraint on musical and literary compositions after the statutory protection, com-
parable to the principles applied in patent law,42 make this contract a violation of
public policy, and therefore the result reached by the majority seems justifiable.
Terms Of The Contract
In 20 East 74th Street v. Minskoff,43 plaintiff, a corporate owner of a co-
operative apartment house, sought damages from defendants, the promoters and
developers of the co-operative, for failure to complete the building according to
contract. The contract included a provision that the occurrence of three specified
events would be considered by all the parties as "conclusive proof that the building
has been fully completed in accordance with the provisions of this agreement."
All three events, it was agreed, had occurred. The principal problem was whether,
in spite of this contract provision and the occurrence of the three events, the
defendants could be held liable on the theory that the conclusive presumption of
40. Cf. Burace v. Danna, 248 N. Y. 18, 16 N. E. 315 (1928).
41. 308 N. Y. at 378, 126 N. E. at 290.
42. Supra, note 39.
43. 308 N. Y. 407, 126 N. E. 2d 532 (1955).
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completion had a limited application. The court held this provision was "prompted
by a desire to avoid a multiplicity of controversies with the purchasers of apart-
ments concerning whether the building had been, in fact, completed." Hence, in
absence of fraud or mistake "the presumption of completion was intended by the
parties to be conclusive for all of the purposes of the agreement."
When the terms of a written contract are unambiguous the courts will construe
it based on the intention of the parties as gathered from the instrument itsel. 4
When by the terms of a contract a specific criterion is established to determine
what constitutes performance, that criterion will be adopted by the courts in the
absence of fraud or mistake.4 5 Furthermore, the criterion will control for all
purposes of the agreement, in the absence of language in the contract to the
contrary 46
One other point was considered briefly in this case. Plaintiff tried to enforce
an oral agreement made subsequent to the written contract to accomplish its
purpose. The written contract contained a provision made in accordance with
Personal Property Law Sec. 33-C subd. 147. This provision states that "no change
or modification of the terms and conditions of this agreement shall be binding
upon the Sellers unless the same shall be in writing, signed by Sam Minskoff on
behalf of the Sellers." In the light of this clause and the lack of consideration for
the oral promises, the court felt plaintiff had no enforceable right under an
oral agreement.
44. Heller and Henretig Inc. v. 8620 168th St. Inc., 302 N. Y. 326, 98 N. E. 2d
458 (1951); Brinard v. New York Central Railroad Co., 242 N. Y. 125, 151 N. E. 152
(1926); Hartigan v. Casualty Co., 227 N. Y. 175, 124 N. E. 789 (1919).
45. Wyokoff v. Meyers, 44 N. Y. 143 (1876).
46. See note 1 supra, pg. 415.
47. New York Personal Property Law Sec. 33-c Subd. 1 states: "A written
agreement or other written instrument which contains a provision to the effect
that it cannot be changed orally, cannot be changed by an executory agreement
unless such executory agreement is in writing and signed by the party against
whom enforcement of the change is sought or by his agent."
